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DEPT FOR AF/RSA CHRISTOPHER POMMERER
DEPT FOR INL/AAE AARON ALTON
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SUBJECT: MALI: INCREASED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING RESPONSE

REF: A. STATE 05448
1B. BAMAKO 00064

1.(SBU) As noted in Ref (b), Bamako is pleased to be polled on the need for increased law enforcement and judicial training. This initiative tracks with recent planning at post and exchanges with neighboring missions as well as other diplomatic missions here about the need to ramp up law enforcement engagement so that these authorities can play their appropriate role in territorial control against threats posed by multiple trafficking sources and terrorism. As noted in our Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) peace and security goal, increased law enforcement training, coordinated by a new law enforcement position, would support the systemic improvements required to improve the capacity of Malian police and judicial authorities and reinforce valuable tools in stemming illicit flows often linked to the support of international terrorists present in northern Mali. We would also welcome Department support for regionalized training initiatives. Our responses to questions posed in reftel are provided below.

2.(SBU) The key internal and regional challenges facing Malian law enforcement officials are trafficking (guns, drugs, people, and commercial goods) and terrorism. Small arms trafficking poses a continual challenge for Malian officials. Although many of the arms trafficked in Mali pass through Mali's sparsely populated and extremely isolated northern regions, a significant quantity of smuggled arms are also moved across Mali's southern frontiers. Drug trafficking is becoming an increasingly serious problem as criminal elements come to regard Bamako International Airport as an important transit point for drug shipments. There is also increasing concern about narcotics flows across the Burkinabe and Guinean borders into Mali. Northern Mali continues to serve as a safe haven for the terrorist group Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

3.(U) Mali's non-military capacity to respond to these challenges is extremely limited due to training shortfalls, resource constraints, skills deficits, and lack of equipment.

4.(SBU) The definition of specific non-military security and judicial training requirements is a work in progress, recently assisted by a multidisciplinary State assessment team visit with members from Anti-Terrorism Assistance, INL, and S/CT. We have recently learned that UNODC has completed a survey of needs related to counter-narcotics and financial flows. The most recent State assessment identifies a range of needs, from basic law enforcement training, to airport and border security, and crime scene management, generally in that priority order. We firmly believe that the attention of a full-time law enforcement position is key to the relationship building and situational awareness required to

best identify organizational weaknesses, gaps, and systemic improvements needed, and to ensure that training and equipment are directed effectively to achieve genuine results.

5.(SBU) The host government is eager to accept and participate in USG programs designed to support civilian police and the judiciary. Minister of Internal Security, Sadio Gassama, has repeatedly expressed interest in increased training opportunities. The Ministry of Interior Security oversees the police, gendarmes and portions of the Malian national guard. The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance (which oversees customs officers) are also highly supportive of assistance programs for judicial officers and customs officials.

6.(U) France and the European Union provide limited support to the Malian law enforcement and judicial sectors but have recently indicated an interest in expanded opportunities, possibly in collaboration with the USG.

7.(U) There is no non-military regional training center in Mali.

8.(U) Embassy Bamako's point of contact for this initiative is Political Officer Fred Noyes.
MILOVANOVIC